¿POR QUÉ EL REALISMO MORAL?

Abstract

In this paper, I critically examine Guillermo Lariguet’s defense of moral realism. I argue that his account is ultimately unsatisfactory because it fails to provide a sufficiently clear characterization of what “moral facts” are. Although moral realism typically involves ontological, epistemological, and semantic claims—namely, that moral facts exist, can be known, and ground the truth or falsity of moral judgments—I contend that these theses remain obscure unless the nature of such facts is clearly specified. In my view, the
main motivation behind moral realism is to confront moral skepticism and relativism. I fully share that concern, but I disagree with the realist strategy. Instead, I defend a form of minimal moral objectivism: a cognitivist and fallibilist position grounded not in robust moral facts or strong notions of moral truth, but in the objectivity of practical reasons and the idea of correctness. I believe this alternative overcomes skepticism without incurring heavy metaphysical commitments or absolutist implications.