REALISMO MORAL Y PERFORMATIVIDAD. UNA POSIBLE COMPATIBILIDAD DESDE LA FILOSOFÍA DEL LENGUAJE Y LA LINGÜÍSTICA

Abstract

This paper explores the interaction between language and moral realism by analyzing how moral judgments, in their performative use, can be reconciled with the existence of an objective and independent moral reality. From a perspective that draws on both the philosophy of language and linguistics, it is argued that the constitutive nature of language in moral contexts does not necessarily imply that morality depends on linguistic or social conventions. Building on Lariguet’s readings of Searle, Korsgaard, and Putnam, as well as contributions from Hare, Saussure, Coseriu, and Austin the paper distinguishes between linguistic  normativity and independent moral values as extra linguistic referents. It  emphasizes that while moral judgments are linguistically expressed and constitute obligations within communication, they do not alter the ontological existence of  moral values. Finally, the paper defends the compatibility between a constitutive use of language and moral realism, while also addressing the challenges that arise from this position.